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MOTIVES FOR IDEALIZING THE PRAGMATIC
LEWIS H. LARUE
I. INTRODUCTION
I hope that my title is neutral enough so that one can tell that I do not
come to debunk or to scorn. I wish to understand a highly human phe-
nomenon, i.e., the way we idealize our most pragmatic activities such as
science and law.
Let me start with the obvious: we all, from time to time, idealize sci-
ence and law. The "Law Day" speech is the classic venue for idealizing law,
as anyone who has ever sat through such an event can testify.' Although
there is no equivalent event called "Science Day," its absence has not pre-
vented scientists from delivering speeches that sound like parodies of the
average Law Day speech.2 To be sure, one could dismiss these examples as
not proving much; a ceremonial speech does not reveal much about ac-
tual practice. So the more complicated (and important) question is
whether we idealize science and law when it really matters, i.e., when we
are doing serious work? And furthermore, if we do, is any harm done?
All told, there is much to admire in our tendency to idealize, even
though it is dangerous at times. In our book, 3 David Caudill and I tried to
show how the judicial tendency to idealize science can have two bad conse-
quences: it can lead toward being too credulous (science is always good)
or too dismissive (the scientist in court is not ideal enough). Legal schol-
ars who have studied the problems of using science in the courtroom tend
to replicate the judicial error, and they further compound the problem by
idealizing the law (generally, by imagining that judges, jurors and lawyers
can and should do more than they can). 4 In this article, I do not wish to
replay the book, repeating the evidence and analysis present there. In-
stead, I wish to step back from the book and reflect on what Caudill and I
have written. I assume that idealizing science and law, like many things,
has both an upside and a downside. We show in our book how idealizing
can be dangerous; in this article, I wish to consider what the benefits
might be.
1. See FED. R. EVID. 602 (addressing personal knowledge). Because I teach
Evidence (among other things), my footnote for this assertion refers to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
2. See FED. R. EvID. 201 (addressing judicial notice). An adequate footnote on
this point would be a book-length essay, so let me dodge the issue the way I did for
the last footnote and cite the Federal Rules of Evidence.
3. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIs H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZA-
TION OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2006).
4. See id. at 64-75.
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Since I wish to speculate a bit on this huge and fascinating phenome-
non of idealizing our pragmatic activity, let me work up to it gradually by
backing away from the topic marked out by my title and saying something
about how I first became interested in studying the use of science in the
courtroom and how I came to the task of co-authoring a book. My interest
in the topic-science in the courtroom-grew out of my larger interest in
legal argument.5 As a scholar, I have carved out my niche by studying and
writing about the rhetoric of Supreme Court opinions.6 But to study
solely the Supreme Court is to narrow one's focus, and as I approached
the last quarter of my career as a teacher, I wanted to return to the home
ground of my origins. I began my legal career (post-law school) as a trial
lawyer, and I wanted to return to my home venue and study argument at
trial. To study argument on appeal was proving ever less satisfying.
As an excuse to return to home ground, I talked my dean into letting
me teach Evidence. Fortunately, after a few years of stumbling, I turned
out to be rather good at it, and so my students and I have lived "happily
ever after." Teaching Evidence turned out to be, for me, a classic example
of the grass being greener on the other side of the fence. So let me give a
warning: even when the grass turns out to be greener, it still needs to be
mowed, and the real problem with greener grass is that one must mow it
more often. To study argument in the Supreme Court, I only needed to
study persuasion, and in particular, the historical relativity of persuasion.
But trials are not appellate proceedings; in order to study argument at
trial, I needed to study proof as well as persuasion. Indeed, I needed to
study science, which brings me to my co-author, David Caudill.
David has long been one of my most valued colleagues. We have dif-
fered intellectually, but we have always enjoyed exploring our differences.
If I may speak by way of a glib hyperbole, I would characterize our differ-
ences by saying that David is one of the hip post-modernists, whereas I am
an unreconstructed Platonist. When we start talking about any issue, I
begin by puzzling over the "form" of the question and the "logic" of the
inquiry, whereas David begins by "contextualizing" the issue and by seeing
what is "problematic" about our claims to knowledge. As you can imagine,
our differences generated a lot for us to talk about, especially when the
talk turned to science. And as academics will do, we decided to get extra
credit for having fun by memorializing our conversations in print (to date,
four articles and a book) .7 Our strategy for generating academic credit
5. In two of my books, Political Discourse: A Case Study of the Watergate Affair and
Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority, I have published
some studies on argument in the public arena.
6. See generally, e.g., Lewis H. LaRue, The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 43 (1981). In retrospect, this article can be seen as terminus ab quo of
this scholarly agenda.
7. See generally CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 3; David S. Caudill & Lewis H.
LaRue, Post-Trilogy Science in the Courtroom: What Are The Judges Doing?, 13 J. Civ.
LITIG. 341 (2001-02); David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Post-Trilogy Science in the
Courtroom, Part II: What Are the Judges Still Doing?, 15J. Crv. LITIG. 1 (2003); David S.
844 [Vol. 52: p. 843
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has obviously worked because a substantial number of lawyers and stu-
dents turned up at a symposium to hear us (and others) talk.
8
As you can surely imagine, the chief stumbling block for a Platonist
like me was the post-modernist concept of "the social construction of sci-
ence." David had a hard time bending my mind around this concept, but
in the end, I did. In order to be sympathetic, however, I had to reshape
the concept so that my dark Platonic soul could assimilate it. So let me
describe to you the way a Platonist reshapes the concept of social construc-
tion. (Perhaps the verb should be "distort," not "reshape.")
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUcrION
My first hurdle was the way the question was stated. Some of the early
stuff that David told me to read described the intellectual choice as believ-
ing either that scientific theories were forced on us by nature or else so-
cially constructed.9 Because I believe in the tidy procedures of logic, I did
not like the verb-change from "forced" to "constructed." The logician in
me was offended. If we bring the verbs into a parallelism, we should op-
pose something like "forced on us by nature" versus "forced on us by soci-
ety," or else "constructed by our biological endowment" versus
"constructed by our social endowment." The metaphor of "force" seemed
totally inept to me, but the metaphor of "construct" seemed to offer some
possibilities worth pursuing.
The second hurdle I had to conquer before David and I could work
together on a book was the debunking impulse that seemed to lie behind
the social construction thesis, as it appeared in all too many of its versions.
Indeed, some of the post-modernist literature that David had me read
seemed to be positively paranoid about the possibility that someone might
"privilege" science over other forms of knowing. To deal with the second
hurdle, I did what I did with the first hurdle and fell back on the tidy
procedures of the logicians; my first task was to put the question into a
proper logical form by clarifying some of the key terms, stating alternative
hypotheses, imagining what might count as evidence pro or con to any
hypothesis and so forth.
I will not bore you with the twists and turns of my investigations; let
me cut to the chase-science is a social construction. My logical argument
is both simple and straightforward. If the knowledge of science were bio-
logically natural, then the overwhelming majority of sane adults would
Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know
About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical-and Not Just the Methodological-Aspects
of Science, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2003); Lewis H. LaRue & David S. Caudill, A Non-
Romantic View of Expert Testimony, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (2004).
8. The series of articles in this issue of the Villanova Law Review memorialize
a symposium that was attended by an astonishingly large audience.
9. I think it better to leave these foolish scribblings in the obscurity of
anonymity.
2007]
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have a basic competence in science; they don't, so it isn't.10 (This logical
move is called "modus tollens," by the way.) I understand, however, that
many of you may not share my faith in logic, so let me make a more ex-
tended analysis. The central skill that one needs to do well in science is
mathematics, especially calculus. For physics, this is clear. For those social
scientists who live and die by statistics, it is also clear, although it may be
less obvious. The central concept that lies at the intersection of
probability theory and statistical theory is the concept of the "random vari-
able."" Unfortunately, a complete analysis of random variables requires
calculus. 1 To be sure, the ordinary social scientist can go along quite well
in routine work by following "the cookbook recipes" for statistical proce-
dures, and thus need not worry about the mathematical foundations of his
art. But when the going gets rough (as it often will), someone must step
in who has a sophisticated understanding of the mathematics of calculus.
If we grant the importance of calculus, then a simple question follows:
is knowledge of calculus constructed "by our biological endowment" or
"by our social endowment?" I can assume, I suppose, that everyone who
heard this lecture and those who now read it have the normal equipment
that Mother Nature has granted us. But I will not assume that this vast (or
miniscule) audience knows enough calculus to play in the scientific sand-
box.13 It is rather obvious, I think, that one must go through an arduous
form of training, which has both social and personal costs, before one can
know enough calculus to speak the magic words. I could go on with other
skills that are necessary, but I trust that the point is obvious. (Were I to go
on, I would talk about the intellectual skills one needs to conduct a valid
public opinion survey or a valid laboratory experiment, plus the social
skills that one needs to round up the human and financial capital that
makes the whole enterprise possible.)
But even if we grant that science is socially constructed, how could
this have anything to do with whether science is or is not a privileged way
of knowing about the world? Why have some (not all) of the post-modern-
10. One can contrast other human capacities that seem to be constructed by
our biological endowment, such as perceiving the world in three dimensions and
conversing in our native language. We are not born with these capacities fully
developed, but we "grow" these capacities as we grow up.
11. See DAVID WILLIAMS, WEIGHING THE ODDS: A COURSE IN PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICS 47-49 (2001) (using concept of random variables to unite mathematics
of probability and statistics).
12. Our intuitive grasp of probability and statistics rests on the concept of
"relative frequency in the long run." Yet there is no way to use this concept as a
foundation because there is no way to give a firm basis to the notion of "in the long
run," nor is there any principled way to state how long the run must be. Conse-
quently, the professionals use a mathematical dodge; they define functions that
generate random variables, and then use these functions to model randomness.
As you probably know, to use mathematical functions well, one needs to use
calculus.
13. By the way, let me confess that I do not know enough to play; my compe-
tence in math is that of an interested amateur.
[Vol. 52: p. 843846
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ists thought that the social construction thesis supports the debunking the-
sis? While I will certainly agree that physicists have no privileged
knowledge on how to live a good life, I also gladly grant to physicists a
privileged knowledge about why the earth rotates around the sun. So
what's the big deal? If you want to know about cosmology, study physics.
If you want to know about the structure of the family, study sociology. If
you want to know about the evil that lies deep in the human psyche, study
Shakespeare. And if you want to know the basic rules of ethics, pay atten-
tion to your grandmother.
Let me pause over the debunking phenomenon a bit because I think
that it is an example of a pervasive fallacy that is rampant among intellec-
tuals, i.e., the fallacy that I was taught to call the "genetic fallacy." This
fallacy rests on the thesis that the way in which ideas are generated condi-
tions their possible claims to truth. For example, there are those who be-
lieve that the ideas generated by one's political opponents are necessarily
false. One can gather good examples of this phenomenon by observing
how the members of the chattering class, be they conservative or liberal,
seem to think that showing how an idea fits into the world view of their
opponents is enough to discredit it.14 To be sure, all rational thinkers
take into account the source of the information presented to them in
judging its credibility, but even a madman can tell the truth. To dismiss
out of hand any idea presented by one's political opponents is to reason
poorly.
To be sure, the particular version of the genetic fallacy that I wish to
challenge is more subtle, and indeed, it has an intellectual respectability
that the typical political pamphleteer lacks. The debunking fallacy takes a
form that seems initially quite plausible. If I understand it correctly, the
argument that science is not the privileged way for understanding nature
runs as follows: (1) science is a social construction; (2) the current social
construction of science is historically contingent and relative because it is
the product of the unfathomable twists and turns of history; (3) therefore,
current scientific theories are contingent and relative; and (4) further-
more, this shows that science is not a privileged way of knowing. This
argument has hidden within it both good sense and bad. The good is the
point that our current knowledge is not final; it is subject to the contin-
gency of being modified and rejected in the future. The bad is to think
that this fact of contingency shows that scientific knowledge is not the priv-
ileged way to know how the world is put together. The obvious point is
that the current cosmology will be overturned, if it is overturned, by future
cosmology, not by future sociology or poetry. Current science will be
modified by future science, not by other ways of knowing. Those who
study the social construction of science have absolutely nothing of value to
say about the future of cosmology or about its weaknesses or strengths.
They have a great deal of value to say about how cosmology has developed.
14. See FED. R. EVD. 201; FED. R. EvID. 602.
2007]
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In short, I wish to assert that science is indeed a social construction,
while also asserting that science is the privileged way of learning how the
world is put together.
III. THE LuRE Or THE IDEAL
So what is the problem? Why do people, especially scientists, reject
out of hand any contention that science is a social construction? In large
part, I think it is rejected because of the packaging. All too often, the
thesis is advanced by those who wish to debunk, and scientists quite prop-
erly respond adversely to those who have such an agenda. They quite
properly suspect that those who debunk are not competent in the sub-
stance of science, and so they reject the thesis as pretentious and incompe-
tent. Scientists, however, also seem to reject the thesis when it is presented
by those who do not wish to debunk, and it is this rejection on which I
wish to opine. The case in which I am interested might be represented by
the following colloquy:
Outsider: "Part of the social construction of science is its finan-
cial base, and funds do not rain down freely, falling equally upon
all scientists without regard to the agenda of their research."
Scientist: "True, but that fact is an inessential feature of science;
such accidents do not affect the inner core of true science."
If you wish, you can conduct your own survey and see if you turn up
something that resembles the above; my colleague David Caudill has done
a preliminary (and non-randomized) inquiry to get some feel for the way
that typical scientists might respond, and he got results that resemble this
colloquy. Furthermore, he has told me that his preliminary inquiry has
turned up results that are consistent with what others have found.
1 5
We need not get bogged down in adjudicating this dispute; we need
not decide who is right, the Outsider or the Scientist. Were we to do so,
we would need to pull apart exactly what the Outsider and the Scientist
wish to assert (the passages above are too ambiguous to be tested), we
would need to establish criteria that would guide the investigation (what
sort of evidence would be relevant to testing these claims) and then we
would need to do some hard empirical work. As you might guess, I do not
intend to conduct this sort of inquiry. (I lack the good character that is
needed to conduct hard empirical work.) Instead, I am interested in teas-
ing out why scientists, who know quite well the grubby reality of science as
they live it, insist that "true" science, or "real" science, is something other
than messy practice with which they are familiar. It does seem to me that
scientists have an image of an ideal of science and that this ideal picture is
very important to them.
15. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 3, at 91-103, 110-18 (2006) (reporting
on some depositions of scientific testimony in tobacco litigation and on interviews
with three professors in university psychology department).
848 [Vol. 52: p. 843
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Let me start with a single example: the most celebrated scientist of the
twentieth century, Albert Einstein. I am able to provide this example be-
cause of a book by Peter Galison, which we cite in our book. 1 6 By chance,
I had purchased this in a bookstore on a whim, and when I suggested to
David that it would fit well in our book, he was delighted because he was
already familiar with Galison's work and agreed with me that it was first-
rate. Many of us remember the photographs of Einstein's shaggy appear-
ance, and those of us who do are likely to have heard stories about his
eccentric habits. We have read the stories about how he sat in his study in
Princeton, New Jersey, and wrote pads of equations, hour after hour. He
seemed to embody the image of the detached scientific intellect, and un-
like others who are above the fray, he seemed to be gentle and benign.
Einstein himself described science as an ideal that is pure and removed
from grubby reality. In 1933, Einstein gave a political speech in London's
Royal Albert Hall, he warned his audience about the dangers ahead and
he pleaded with governments to pull back from the crisis. And then, as
has been often reported, he pulled back from talking about the crisis
before the world (perhaps it was too much), and he began to talk about
the life of a scholar and of his need for solitude. "There are certain occu-
pations, even in modern society, which entail living in isolation and do not
require great physical or intellectual effort. Such occupations as the ser-
vice of lighthouses and lightships come to mind."' 7 The lovely metaphor
of a scientist as a lighthouse keeper fits well with our popular image of
Einstein. Sixteen years later, when he wrote up some notes about his life,
he stated firmly, "[T]he essential in the being of a man of my type lies
precisely in what he thinks and how he thinks, not in what he does or
suffers."'s
The reality is far more complex. As we all know, Einstein rethought
the problem of understanding time by focusing intently on the way in
which time is measured. What we may forget is that Einstein did not in-
vent a new way of measuring time. He started with the procedure that
surveyors and cartographers had already developed, i.e., one starts with
two clocks, synchronizes them, then sends a signal from one clock to the
other and adjusts for the time that the signal has taken to travel the dis-
tance. Furthermore, the scientific community was able to accept and un-
derstand Einstein's theories about time because they already knew about
the technical procedures that had been used in mapping the earth.
Not only did Einstein start with a commonplace of technology in his
day, he was well aware of the most recent technical refinements in flashing
signals around the globe. Most of us know that Einstein worked in the
Swiss patent office, but Galison has done us a service by doing the archival
16. See PETER GALISON, EINSTEIN'S CLOCKS, POINCARIu'S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME
(2003).
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id.
2007]
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work on the activities of the patent office; he shows that the problems of
measuring time and distance by sending signals were part of the regular
business of the patent office and that numerous patents were granted for
technological innovations in this area. And by the way, we should not ro-
manticize Einstein's tenure in the patent office as a time of servitude from
which he was liberated by his publications. In fact, Einstein enjoyed his
days in the patent office. He stated: "Working on the final formulation of
technological patents was a veritable blessing for me. It enforced many-
sided thinking and also provided important stimuli to physical thought."19
So, why did he view science as something detached from worldly
entanglements?
Consider an analogy: religion. Every serious believer knows that
churches, temples and mosques are comprised of people, and so most
know that these institutions are imperfect. In fact, it is quite easy to get
believers to tell stories about how imperfect these institutions are. But
still, they believe that religion is more than just the assembly they attend.
Indeed, it is hard to see how' one could be serious about religion unless
one did believe that religion was something more than, and something
better than, the group with whom one worships. Consider another anal-
ogy: universities. Look at any university up close; it is not a pretty sight.
And yet academics are intensely loyal to their ideal of what an academy
should be, and sometimes they even cite, with utmost seriousness, John
Henry Newman's great essay, The Idea of a University.
20
Oscar Wilde once wrote, "The truth is rarely pure and never sim-
ple. '2 1 Caudill and I agree, and we have based our book on that thesis.
Yet we are not cynics (nor was Wilde, by the way; he was a moralist who
preached by mocking); we do not scoff at the belief that scientists should
seek the truth, nor their belief that they should hope that science could be
pure, nor even that a pure and simple truth is an ideal worth pursuing.
Academics and religious believers hold analogous beliefs, and we do not
scoff at them either. Perhaps our refusal to scoff is due to our bad charac-
ter, to that trait of excessive civility that is one of the many bad practices of
which we southerners are guilty. But I would like to believe that we have
some sound philosophic basis for our civility, and so let us ask: what is the
role of the ideal in scientific practice?
IV. THE ROLE OF THE IDEAL
If we want to understand the role of the ideal in Einstein's work, we
need to turn away from Peter Galison's book to Max Jammer's book, Ein-
19. Id. at 241.
20. See JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSrrY (Daniel M.
O'Connell, ed., Loyola Univ. Press 1927) (1873).
21. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 8 (Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
1966) (1899).
850 [Vol. 52: p. 843
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stein and Religion.22 The evidence in this book shows that Einstein was
quite pious when he was young, but that at age twelve, he refused to go
through the bar mitzvah ceremonies because he had ceased to believe.
2 3
Those who turn away from traditional religion can go on to live in radi-
cally different ways. Given the complexity of responses that are possible,
perhaps it is best to quote the mature Einstein, who in 1940 looked back
and wrote:
It is quite clear to me that the religious paradise of youth, which
was thus lost, was a first attempt to free myself from the chains of
the "merely personal," from an existence which is dominated by
wishes, hopes, and primitive feelings. Out yonder there was this
huge world, which exists independently of us human beings and
which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least par-
tially accessible to our inspection and thinking. The contempla-
tion of this world beckoned like a liberation, and I soon noticed
that many a man whom I had learned to esteem and to admire
had found inner freedom and security in devoted occupation
with it. The mental grasp of this extrapersonal world within the
frame of the given possibilities swam as [the] highest aim half
consciously and half unconsciously before my mind's eye ...
The road to this paradise was not as comfortable and alluring as
the road to the religious paradise; but it has proved itself as trust-
worthy, and I have never regretted having chosen it.
2 4
Einstein's own words make it clear that religion was to him the pre-
cursor of science, because in both, one takes a perspective that goes be-
yond one's ego. I do not suggest that all scientists agree with Einstein on
such matters. I doubt that very many scientists are as self-conscious about
the spiritual dimension of science as Einstein was, but I do suspect that an
element of Einstein's perspective lurks within. Consider, for example, the
invectives that one hears scientists utter when they are confronted with the
anti-Darwinian opinions that circulate among us. When one listens, I
think that one should observe the undertones as well as what is said. Each
of you can judge as seems fit, but it does seem to me that I hear what I am
inclined to label as "religious fervor."
My own view is that scientists ought to feel moral outrage when the
basic principles of science are denied by those who reject them for relig-
ious reasons. If they did not feel outrage, this would be evidence that they
were not serious about their own enterprise. Scientists identify with sci-
ence, and when the basic principles of science are rejected, their identity
22. See generally MAX JAMMER, EINSTEIN AND RELIGION (1999).
23. See id. at 16, 24-26.
24. Id. at 28 (quoting Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes, in ALBERT EIN-
STEIN: PHILOSOPHER-SCIENTiST 5 (Paul Arthur Schilpp ed., 2d ed. 1951)).
2007]
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is threatened. One cannot be casual when the fundamental basis of one's
identity is attacked.
To be sure, science is basically a secular practice, and one can do the
work of science from day to day without ever thinking about the broader,
more philosophical nature of the enterprise. But when one looks at the
complexity of the practice, one can observe that the enterprise has a spiri-
tual dimension, a moral dimension and an ideal dimension. How impor-
tant these aspects are is a variable, and discerning the strength of these
several variables is an empirical task that is beyond my agenda for today.
For today, it is enough to insist that these dimensions may be what those
who resist the talk of "social construction" have in mind. I have no prob-
lem with those scientists who resist the social construction thesis on the
grounds that the ideal of science is what they hold most dear. "More
power to them" is my response. But when they come into court, the spiri-
tual and moral dimensions of science do not come with them; when they
testify, they affect the balance of power between two contesting parties;
when they tip the scales of justice, we ought to be aware of the pragmatic
limitations on what they have to say. The ideal core of science is beside
the point in a courtroom, which is the point of our book. Yet the scientist
does not live routinely in the courtroom, and the complex phenomenon
that we call "science" cannot be understood by focusing too closely on
judicial proceedings.
As we look at the larger phenomenon, we see something that I am
inclined to call "spiritual." Perhaps this is a loose use of the word "spiri-
tual," so let me tie it down somewhat. Einstein pointed to the heart of the
matter when he spoke of going beyond one's personal subjectivity, of
aligning one's thoughts and actions with a more objective view of the
world. In theological circles, I have heard the word "transcendent" used
to indicate what is going on. If one goes beyond the narrow bounds of
one's own personality, one is trying to transcend the limitations of a
(childish?) ego. When scientists leave off from being self-interested tech-
nicians and become excited about what they are doing, then I think they
transcend themselves. I hope that the word "spiritual" is a good label for
this phenomenon.
I also wish to assert that complex practices such as science are not
morally neutral. I will grant that if a practice does not change one's char-
acter, then it is morally neutral. But I take it for granted that such prac-
tices as law, science or scholarship do change the type of person that one
is. Whether this change is for the better or the worse, it is unlikely that the
change would be morally neutral.
Finally, I would like to point out that moral and spiritual practices are
guided by an ideal, and indeed, any complex practice is likely guided by
an ideal. Of course, any human action is purposeful, or as philosophers
sometimes say, "intentional." When one brushes one's teeth, one acts pur-
posefully and one's intentions govern the action. But I mean something
852 [Vol. 52: p. 843
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more than mere intentionality when I use the phrase "guided by an ideal."
Consider the scientific practice of designing, and then executing, an ex-
periment. While each act along the way is intentional, it is also something
more. When scientists set up experiments, their actions are guided by
their memory of all they were taught about good scientific practice. They
have a notion of what a good experiment looks like, and they use this
notion as a norm that regulates their practice. They also know that other
scientists will use these norms to criticize or praise what they have done.
Once we see the role of normative ideals in the practice of science,
then we can understand the temptation for idealizing science. Scientists
judge themselves and others by the norms of good science, so it is tempt-
ing to identify science with these norms. Recall that I set out an imaginary
colloquy between a Scientist and an Outsider, in which the Scientist con-
cedes that the agenda of science is often shaped by the flow of funding. As
the old saying goes, he who pays the piper calls the tune. A scientist would
have to be naive beyond belief to be unaware of this reality. And yet, I can
understand why scientists resist the description, say there is more to sci-
ence than that and insist that the true core of science is contained in the
normative ideals that prescribe how science should be done.25 Indeed, I
trust that much good can come from the belief that the true core of sci-
ence is found in its normative ideals; the norms of science are used as a
guide to generating better science. Let such be granted. Yet I do not wish
to grant such a thesis when the scientist comes into court. Doing so would
be a mistake. When scientists come into a courtroom, they are not (by
definition) practicing science, which is one of the reasons many of them
dislike the trip. When they testify, they depart from their daily practice
and attempt to apply science to a particular issue that is usually a rather
narrow "what happened" sort of question, and a whole new level of uncer-
tainty can be generated in applying the general rules of science to the
particular events that we litigate. 26 Since they are not "doing science"
when they come into court, a wholly different set of rules must apply. We
have described in our book the pragmatic view of science that is appropri-
ate for judging expert testimony, so let me wave my hand in the direction
of our book and move on to the issue of idealizing law.
25. There is a complex issue that I will mention in this footnote and then pass
by. The normative ideals that guide scientific practice have changed through time,
and even in our own time, these ideals differ among the many separate islands of
scientific practice. But a footnote is not the place, and I am not the person, to
offer a careful description of these changes and differences.
26. Perhaps the largest unknown that can generate error is the risk of lab
error. In every human activity, humans make errors, and laboratories are operated
by humans; unfortunately, those who run laboratories, including the labs that do
criminal forensic investigations, have resisted efforts to investigate and quantify
their rate of error.
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V. LEGAL ARGUMENT
Legal argument is often thought to be an unethical practice, and even
lawyers rather regularly give apologetic and defensive arguments for our
common practices. But I shall build on the above and try to show that
legal argument, as it is commonly practiced, is guided by an ideal.
Let me start with the grubby reality. When we lawyers go to court, we
argue to judges and juries, and we know that these humans are imperfect.
There were lawyers present in the audience when this lecture was first
presented, and there will be lawyers among those who read this article; I
am confident that these lawyers have experienced what I experienced.
There are judges who are lazy, ignorant or bigoted, although one does not
often get the lethal combination of all three of those vices. And perhaps
they, like me, also believe that jurors are better than judges, but merely
because there are twelve of them. jurors, too, are likely to be lazy, igno-
rant and bigoted, but at least with twelve of them one has a chance that
vice can cancel vice. (As is well known, James Madison built his entire
political theory on the thesis that vice can cancel vice.)
One of my own most memorable experiences in this regard dates
back to the days in 1965 when I worked for the U.S. Department ofJustice
and argued civil rights cases before southern judges. To say that I had a
less than ideal audience would be to understate the matter, and indeed,
one of the judges of whom I have a highly vivid memory was regarded by
many (including most of the local lawyers, who had zero sympathy for my
legal position) as one of the worst judges on the federal bench.
Yet consider one fact: not one of the local lawyers, who were defend-
ing what even they (looking back) would now consider a very bad cause,
ever made an appeal to this judge's obvious bigotry. Why not? Every law-
yer will testify, "It would obviously anger the judge and destroy one's credi-
bility as a lawyer; it would be an incredibly stupid tactic to make an obvious
appeal to prejudice." I agree; but why? In our daily conversation with
each other, we routinely appeal to prejudice, and our appeals are often
persuasive. In politics, appeals to prejudice are routine and are generally
successful. So, what is different? I am reasonably confident that those
who spoke to the judge in question at the country club did make appeals
to prejudice and that he was not offended. But I also have a high degree
of confidence that any lawyer who would have made similar appeals in
court would have committed legal suicide.
I am sure you can guess the punch line: legal argument is regulated
by a norm that says that one must argue to an ideal judge, not to the judge
who is in the room. Consider the basic norms. We lawyers know that
when we argue to judges, the judges do not really understand the facts of
the case. (How could they? They haven't had the time to spend as many
hours on the case as we have.) And yet, one never says, 'Judge, I know
that you are ignorant of the basic facts in this case, so let me enlighten
you." One assumes that, but one conceals the assumption. Furthermore,
[Vol. 52: p. 843
HeinOnline  -- 52 Vill. L. Rev. 854 2007
IDEALIZING THE PRAGMATIC
we know that the judges do not know the law that governs the case as well
as we do. (Once again, how could they? Where would they get the time to
do the research that we and our associates have done?) As one of my
seniors once told me, 'You must argue as though the judge were ignorant
of the law and the facts, and you must conceal that assumption." And if
the judge is also lazy and bigoted, one tries to maneuver around that fact,
while trying not to allude to it. This could be called hypocrisy, and rather
often, it is. Yet it is also an expression of hope; one hopes that the judge
will do the right thing.
So let me say clearly, on behalf of all of the lawyers who might read
this, to all of the judges: whether you are a poor example of a judge or a
noble philosopher, we never argue to you, the actual person that you are;
we argue to whom you ought to be. I think that a philosopher would say
that we make a hypothetical argument. We say, "If you want to follow the
law and the facts, here is how you would decide the case." And since we
lawyers know, when we argue to judges, that everyone in the room knows
that there is more than one way to interpret the facts and more than one
way to interpret the law, we know that more than one argument can be
made. So we try (and normally fail, I assume) to present an ideal version
of the best argument that can be made for one side of the dispute. (We
fail because we too do not spend enough time; we too are not smart
enough; we too are bigots and poor examples.)
I think that the greatest slander on lawyers is that we do not sincerely
speak the truth. We do. We say, "I truly believe that this is the best argu-
ment that can be made for my client." We certainly have our faults, but
not saying what we truly believe is not one of them. Our fault, if it be one,
is in our choice of clients. But once we take up a case, we tell the truth,
albeit a hypothetical truth, which is different from no truth at all.
Please note that my defense of legal argument does not rest on the
thesis that there is no truth to be had. There is, I think, a true version of
the facts that are at the core of every legal dispute. (Herein, you can see
the dark shadow of Plato falling over my head.) But I am quite confident
that we are almost always ignorant of that truth. (And by the way, I think
that Plato also asserts this fact about our ignorance; after all, he wrote that
we live in a cave.) 27 Consequently, there is generally an honest argument
about the facts that can be made on each side.
Furthermore, there are honest arguments about the law that can be
made on each side, for the simple reason that the law contains massive
inconsistencies. Lawyers must argue from authoritative materials, from
the constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations and precedents that we
have inherited. It is an obvious fact that our authorities were generated
over time and by many different hands. It would be a miracle if these
sources were consistent, and they obviously are not. Because it is folly to
27. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BooK VII, lines 514a-520a (using Stephanus
pagination).
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question the ways of Divine Providence and to complain about the ab-
sence of miracles, 28 we must live with inconsistent authority, and as logi-
cians point out, inconsistent premises generate inconsistent conclusions.
So there are always two good arguments about the law that can be made.
VI. CONCLUSION
Let me end by repeating that the practice of law and the practice of
science are both complex human practices and by noting that the com-
plexity that intrigues me the most is the way we humans have mixed to-
gether the ideal and the pragmatic. I think that one must be cautious in
judging the good and the bad of the mixing. In our book, Caudill and I
have pointed out an example of how it can go bad. But the life of Einstein
is an example of how it can go well. So I offer no generalizations, other
than some firmly-held beliefs about the "logic" and the "form" of a well-
conducted inquiry.
28. The world is in great need of some miracles, but were a rational deity to
decide to clean up some of the mess, I suspect that making life simpler for lawyers
would be toward the bottom of the list of priorities.
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